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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
applied in partial satisfaction of defendant's loan. Plaintiff, a judgment
creditor of Hale's, sued to recover that portion of the proceeds which
resulted from the surrender by Hale of a lease to property situated in
New York. Allegedly, the appropriation by defendant of this money
was effected with knowledge of Hale's insolvency and was not au-
thorized by the security agreement. The lower court dismissed the
action for lack of jurisdiction. The Appellate Division, First Depart-
ment reversed, holding that the perfection of the security interest in
New York and the partial liquidation of Hale's assets by defendant
constituted purposeful transactions under the long-arm statute.
CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii): National manufacturer automatically satisfies gen-
eral foreseeability criterion.
CPLR 302(a)(3) was recommended by the Judicial Conference 4
and promptly enacted by the Legislatureu in response to the Court of
Appeals decision in Feathers v. McLucas.8 There, the Court dismissed,
for want of jurisdiction, an action in tort against a foreign corporation
selling steel products on a national scale and presumably realizing that
a defective product could be brought into New York.7 CPLR 302(a)(3)
(ii) therefore provides personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary
who, in person or by an agent, commits a tort (except defamation)
outside New York causing injury therein, if he "expects or should
reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives
substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce." New
Yorkers thereby received greater protection, while the restrictions in-
cluded in this subsection equipped the courts with latitude sufficient
to safeguard the rights of nonresident defendants and to insure justice
in the particular circumstances of each case.9
Theoretically, both elements of CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) must be satis-
4Report to the 1966 Legislature in Relation to the Civil Practice Law and Rules,
TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDicaL CONFERENCE OF THE STATE OF NMw YORK 337,
339-44 (1967) [hereinafter TwE.LFT REP.].
5See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 302, supp. commentary at 128 et seq. (1966); 1 WK&-M
302.10a (1969); Homburger & Laufer, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Torts: The 1966 Amend-
ment of New York's Long-Arm Statute, 16 BUFFALO L. Ray. 67 (1967).
6 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905 (1965).
7Id. at 458, 209 N.E.2d at 76, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 19-20.
8 Emphasis added. There need not be a connection between the tort and the de-
rivation of substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce. 1 WK&M
302.10a.
9"Enthusiasm for extending jurisdiction over foreign persons . . . in limited contact
cases ... may well be tempered by the expectation that the same rule will be redpro-
cally applied .... ." A. Millner Co. v. Noudar, LDA, 24 App. Div. 2d 326, 329, 266
N.YS.2d 289, 294 (1st Dep't 1966).
The limitations were inserted deliberately to keep the provision "well within con-
stitutional bounds." TwELy.T REP. 341.
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fled in order to sustain jurisdiction over a nonresident; 10 yet, it appears
that few defendants in our nuclear society can defeat the imputation
of foreseeability of forum consequences. Indeed, one commentator
has phrased his dissatisfaction with this ephemeral requirement by
asking, "[i]f the defendant's business is both substantial and inter-
state or international in nature, must he not always reasonably expect
some of his products or some of his activities to have effect in this
state?""
That foreseeability of New York consequences will be imputed to
a nationwide manufacturer is suggested by Gonzales v. Harris Calorific
Co. 12 There, the court held cognizable, under CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii),
causes of action for negligence and breach of warranty against an Ohio
corporation. In response to defendant's contention that it did not
anticipate New York consequences, the court ruled that the foresee-
ability requirement was satisfied when the defendant designated a
local corporation as its sole distributor for the metropolitan area; fore-
seeability of the specific injury-producing event is unnecessary.' 3
In view of the ease with which courts are able to identify foresee-
ability of forum consequences, the substantial revenue requirements
become crucial if the rights of the defendant are to remain inviolate.
Unfortunately, the term "substantial revenue" is not defined in the
statute, the Judicial Conference Report, or the Uniform Interstate
and International Procedure Act.' 4 Consequently, an important issue
remains unresolved: is substantial revenue an absolute term, which is
satisfied by a certain number of dollars, or a relative term, which is
satisfied by a minimum percentage of gross income?15 To date, courts
have applied both the percentage' 6 and dollar volume tests17 in deter-
10 TwELFTH REP. 343.
11 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 302, supp. commentary at 132-33 (1966).
12 64 Misc. 2d 287, 315 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Sup. Ct. Queens County), aff'd on opinion below,
35 App. Div. 2d 720, 315 N.Y.S.2d 815 (2d Dep't 1970).
13 See also 1 WK&M 302.10a.
14 Gillmore v. J. S. Inskip, Inc., 54 Misc. 2d 218, 221, 282 N.Y.S.2d 127, 132 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1967). The Judicial Conference stated, however, that the substantial
revenue condition should be construed to exclude from in personam jurisdiction non-
domiciliaries whose businesses are local in character and implied that the defendant should
be engaged in extensive interstate activities before the court exercises jurisdiction. See
TW.LFrH REP. 342-43.
15 Professor McLaughlin has suggested a 10 percent test, 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 302,
supp. commentary at 131 (1966). This proposal was followed in denying jurisdiction in
Chunky v. Blumenthal Bros. Chocolate Co., 299 F. Supp. 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), discussed
in The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 532, 544 (1970); see generally 1 WK&M
302.10a; H. WACHTEr.L, NEw YoRK PRACrICE UNDER THE CPLR 32-33 (3d ed. 1970).
16 E.g., Chunky v. Blumenthal Bros. Chocolate Co., 299 F. Supp. 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
17 E.g., Rietsch v. S.A. Des Automobiles Peugot, 45 Misc. 2d 274, 277-78, 256 N.Y.S.2d
772, 775 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1965).
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mining whether the "substantial revenue" requirement was satisfied.
Undoubtedly, however, there is an urgent need for a legislative or an
appellate pronouncement regarding minimum amounts under either
test in order to prevent needless, time-consuming litigation.
CPLR 316: Notice effected by advertisements and handbills in con-
demnation proceedings deemed adequate in view of the circumstances.
The United States Supreme Court considered the constitutional
requirements regarding notice in Schroeder v. City of New York.' 8
Therein, condemnation proceedings were brought to acquire the right
to divert a portion of a river some twenty-five miles upstream from
plaintiff's summer home. Notice was attempted only by publication
in local newspapers and by posting signs on trees and poles along the
river during the winter. The Court ruled that this mode of service
was constitutionally deficient with respect "to a person whose name and
address are known or very easily ascertainable and whose legally pro-
tected interests are directly affected by the proceedings in question."' 9
In re Massapequa - Woodbury Road0 claimants, owners of
a gas station adjacent to a condemned street, contended that they had
not received actual notice of the condemnation proceedings. The court
nonetheless ruled that the required advertisement and the posting of
handbills on or near the property to be acquired satisfied the notice
requirements of the Constitution under the facts of this particular
case.
21
At first glance, it seems incongruous to hold that the plaintiff
in Schroeder, whose property was twenty-five miles from the condemned
area, was entitled to actual notice, while the claimants in the instant
case, owners of property abutting the taking area, do not have the
same right. Nonetheless, the criterion for notice consistent with the
due process clause is that "reasonably calculated, under all the circum-
stances, to apprise interested parties" of the pendency of an action.22
If for no reason other than the fact that the proposed acquisition by
the state is likely to be a conversational topic among the local residents,
it seems reasonable to presume that a party who owns property in the
proximate vicinity will be sufficiently informed of his rights by means
of advertisements and handbills.
18 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
19ld. at 212-13.
20 64 Misc. 2d 976, 316 N.Y.S.2d 489 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1970).
21 Id. at 979, 316 N.Y.S.2d at 491-92.
22 Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
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